House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Michael McCaul (R-TX) and Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Bob Menendez (D-NJ) sent a letter to Secretary of State Antony Blinken and CIA Director William Burns calling for a classified briefing on the reported Chinese spy facility in Cuba. The chairmen are deeply alarmed with the national security implications of the CCP growing intelligence and military capabilities 90 miles from America’s shores.  

“The American public needs to be assured that their government unequivocally condemns this escalation, and is working to do everything in its power to counter it,” the committee chairs wrote. “While we understand the sensitive nature of this matter, Congress also requires greater transparency and clarity about these developments.”

“In order for us to fulfill our constitutional duties of oversight as Chairs of the Senate Foreign Relations and House Foreign Affairs Committees – as well as duties as representative of the American people – it is imperative that we understand in full detail: the exact nature and objectives of the PRC’s intelligence gathering in Cuba and military partnership with the regime; the implications of such efforts for U.S. national interests; and what the Biden Administration is doing to mitigate such efforts, and deter their further expansion within Cuba and the Western Hemisphere,” the chairmen continued. 

The full text of the letter can be found here and below. 

We write to express our alarm about recent reports that the Cuban regime and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have colluded to establish a deeply concerning military and intelligence partnership less than 100 miles from our shores. Congress and the American public deserve clarity about the national security implications of this direct provocation by our adversaries, and the concrete steps the Administration plans to take in response.

While reporting on this issue continues to develop, the American public now knows that since at least 2019, Cuba and the PRC have worked to develop the PRC’s intelligence capacity in Cuba that, at the very least, can monitor and intercept communications in the Southeastern United States, potentially targeting military bases in the region, U.S. maritime traffic in the Caribbean, and sensitive and private communications between Americans. This is unacceptable.

It comes as no surprise to us that the Cuban regime—which has historically opened its doors to foreign adversaries of the United States—and the PRC are working together to undermine U.S. national security. However, the establishment of intelligence facilities and expansion of military ties this close to U.S. territory is a significant, escalatory step.

The American public needs to be assured that their government unequivocally condemns this escalation, and is working to do everything in its power to counter it. While we understand the sensitive nature of this matter, Congress also requires greater transparency and clarity about these developments. In order for us to fulfill our constitutional duties of oversight as Chairs of the Senate Foreign Relations and House Foreign Affairs Committees – as well as duties as representative of the American people – it is imperative that we understand in full detail: the exact nature and objectives of the PRC’s intelligence gathering in Cuba and military partnership with the regime; the implications of such efforts for U.S. national interests; and what the Biden Administration is doing to mitigate such efforts, and deter their further expansion within Cuba and the Western Hemisphere. We specifically request that the State Department and Central Intelligence Agency provide a classified briefing to our committees, no later than July 14, 2023, regarding the following questions:

1. What is the nature and scale of the PRC’s current logistics, basing, and collection infrastructure, including intelligence collection infrastructure, within Cuba? Where is the infrastructure located? Please describe in detail the operation of such infrastructure, including whether it is operated jointly with the Cuban regime and the PRC.
2. How long has the PRC had an operational logistics, basing, and collection infrastructure established in Cuba? When did the United States government first raise the issue of these PRC activities in Cuba with the Cuban regime and the government of the PRC?
3. The Administration has publicly confirmed that the PRC has taken steps to upgrade and expand its intelligence collection capacity within Cuba since 2019. Please describe in detail the nature of this expansion. What companies are providing or selling equipment to support the expansion? Is the United States government aware of any recent or ongoing discussions between the PRC and the Cuban regime to further expand the PRC’s logistics, basing, and collection infrastructure on the island?
4. What compensation, incentives, or commitments did the Cuban regime receive or provide in exchange for the establishment and expansion of the PRC’s logistics, basing, and collection infrastructure in Cuba?
5. What is the Administration’s assessment of the PRC’s objectives in establishing and expanding its intelligence operations within Cuba?
6. What is the Administration’s assessment of the impact that the establishment and expansion of the PRC’s intelligence collection infrastructure within Cuba has had, and would have, on U.S. national interests, including military operations, intelligence community vulnerabilities, and commercial espionage? To what extent has the PRC’s intelligence collection capacity been used to monitor or intercept communications related to maritime traffic in the Caribbean, U.S. military bases, satellite transmissions, or other sensitive matters?
7. What actions, diplomatic and otherwise, has the Administration taken in response to the PRC’s efforts to bolster its logistics, basing, and collection infrastructure within Cuba, including efforts to mitigate the effectiveness of such intelligence gathering activities? How are these efforts consistent or different from those pursued by the previous administration? How successful have our efforts been?
8. Please describe in detail your conversations with the Cuban regime and the government of the PRC on these training and signals intelligence issues. Please provide information on each date such conversations occurred, and the level at which such conversations took place.
9. What is the Administration’s assessment of the current state of Cuba-PRC relations? Aside from the PRC’s logistics, basing, and collection infrastructure within Cuba, are there additional issues of particular concern to the United States and our national interest regarding Cuba-PRC relations?
10. What is the Administration’s assessment of the implications of a PRC logistics, basing, and collection infrastructure in Cuba in terms of Cuba’s cooperation on intelligence and military issues with the Russian Federation and the Islamic Republic of Iran? Provide a breakdown of estimated intelligence and military personnel from the aforementioned nations.
11. Is the PRC operating, expanding, or attempting to establish, any additional logistics, basing, training, and collection infrastructure in the Western Hemisphere outside of Cuba? If so, please describe in detail the location, nature, and scale of such infrastructure, including personnel, intelligence officers, and troops, as well as what additional actions the United States government has taken in response.
12. What is the latest on reporting of the PRC and Cuban regime discussing expanding training programs in Cuba? Which PRC entity is involved in this training, and what is the operational capacity they hope to achieve through this program?

Original source can be found here.