I would like to commend the great work the IIJ is doing to counter REMVE. This workshop, focusing on REMVE radicalization within security services, addresses a critically important subject – one that is of great concern to governments around the world.
We are pleased that the IIJ continues to build on and to operationalize its work in developing the first-ever guide for criminal justice practitioners to counter REMVE, launched almost two years ago.
The guide is intended for everyone here – law enforcement, criminal justice practitioners, and policymakers.
It focuses on the critical role that you all play in countering the growing transnational REMVE threat and includes good practices on counterterrorism tools and legislation within the criminal justice sector to effectively tackle REMVE concerns, including the risks posed by individuals in the security services.
It also highlights the essential role that civil society and other relevant stakeholders play, and the importance of involving and coordinating with civil society on REMVE-related issues.
Hopefully everyone has had a chance to read the guide. I encourage you to do so, if you have not.
Insider Threat
As the IIJ guide lays out, one of the most dangerous threats that governments face is the potential insider threat within security services.
Members of the military, law enforcement, and other current and former security service personnel radicalized to adopt REMVE ideology, can be especially lethal due to their “access to weapons, training, and intelligence.”
The U.S. is certainly not immune from this threat.
According to a 2022 study by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism at the University of Maryland, there has been an increase within the last decade in the U.S. of domestic violent extremists with military backgrounds, including a large number of military veterans.
For example, from 1990-2010, the study found an average of about 7 people per year with U.S. military backgrounds, including veterans, committed extremist crimes. Over the last decade, that number more than quadrupled to more than 28 people per year.
There are a number of recent examples of extremist activity in the United States abound. The January 6, 2021 attack on the U.S. Capitol is just one such example.
About 10 percent of the individuals charged in the January 6 attack were veterans, and at least five individuals were serving in the military at the time.
Many of these individuals have connections to white supremacist, anti-government, or conspiracy theory groups.
Following the January 6 attack, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin ordered the U.S. military to reinforce existing procedures in order to prohibit violent extremist activity, including standardizing screening questionnaires for new hires.
Role of U.S. Government
Throughout this roundtable, we will hear how governments and civil society organizations are working to address this challenging and complex threat.
We will also discuss recommendations for governments and civil society to address potential insider threat proactively, such as those that the IIJ guide outlines, which include “developing systems to identify individuals with potential REMVE affiliations or sympathies within the ranks of the police and military forces.”
These issues are a priority for the Biden-Harris Administration. The U.S. Government is committed to countering the REMVE threat, and in particular, the potential threat posed by security service personnel.
In 2021, the Administration released the first-ever National Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism, which highlights a need for increased training for servicemembers, who separate or retire from the U.S. military, on potential targeting of those individuals by REMVE actors.
The Strategy discusses how the U.S Government is improving its screening and vetting processes to ensure that REMVE actors are not employed within the U.S. military or law enforcement sectors.
U.S. Government agencies are developing training and resources at the state, local, and tribal levels in order to prevent individuals who pose REMVE threats from being placed in positions of trust.
Additionally, updates are being made to federal forms used to apply for sensitive positions within the U.S. Government that could assist investigators in identifying potential REMVE threats.
We will hear later in this roundtable from other U.S. Government colleagues on this broader threat in the United States and how different agencies are addressing it.
Role of Law Enforcement/Criminal Justice Practitioners
I would also like to highlight the important role that the State Department is playing to build the capacity of law enforcement and criminal justice practitioners to address the REMVE threat.
We have worked with close partners to address this issue. We collaborated with the Government of the United Kingdom to co-fund the IIJ initiative, and last year, last May we launched the Counterterrorism Law Enforcement Forum with the Government of Germany.
Many of the governments and institutions here today were represented at the forum, which brought together law enforcement and criminal justice practitioners from more than 40 countries around the world, as well as representatives from multilateral organizations.
The forum promoted information sharing among law enforcement and criminal justice practitioners on REMVE activity, including by highlighting the transnational linkages between and among REMVE actors.
Participants shared information about recent governmental law enforcement actions to disrupt REMVE activity, underscoring how and why criminal justice tools and approaches are critical to countering REMVE.
They also cited the IIJ’s practitioner’s guide as a valuable resource for countries to consult as they develop new strategies, laws, and approaches to counter REMVE.
At the forum launch event, police investigators and prosecutors shared lessons learned from major REMVE attacks in recent years. Officials from a range of countries noted similar trends in the attacks that have occurred. In most cases, they were carried out by young males who were not part of an organization or group and were inspired by likeminded individuals on the Internet.
In some of these cases, officials shared that there were red flags which, had they been taken seriously and reported, should have raised concerns, including among family members, associates, or the general public.
We are looking forward to holding the second meeting of the forum in early June, which the Government of Norway will co-host in Oslo.
Information Sharing
In this environment, where we are seeing patterns and similarities in REMVE attacks and activity around the world, it is vital that we increase information sharing and coordination on these issues. Governments, civil society organizations, and the private sector all have a role to play in countering this threat.
While concern about REMVE has increased in the past several years, we still do not have the same type of routine international information sharing for law enforcement in place against these particular threats, as we have to counter groups like ISIS and al-Qa’ida.
Expanding information sharing between countries is critical to understanding the threat that REMVE actors pose, including by increasing awareness of the transnational nature of REMVE.
This includes encouraging partner governments to nominate REMVE actors, as appropriate, into their own national watchlists as well as into international law enforcement platforms, including those of INTERPOL.
We must utilize existing tools to enhance cooperation and share information to counter the REMVE threat.
No country or multilateral entity can take on this threat alone.
We have seen by the attacks that have occurred recently that REMVE actors are inspired by each other and that REMVE threats cross borders and continents.
The United States is fully committed to further strengthening our efforts and working with all of you and others in the international community to effectively address the global REMVE threat.
Conclusion
Over the next two days, we will hear from policymakers, law enforcement officials, and think tank experts about how to effectively prevent, assess, and identify the risk of radicalization to REMVE within the security services.
We will also discuss processes that governments have developed to screen individuals applying to join the security services, and methods to assess current members for potential history of or risks of radicalization to REMVE.
The roundtable will serve as an opportunity for practitioners to share lessons learned and increase collaboration and coordination with other like-minded practitioners who too are working to counter the REMVE threat in the security services.
I look forward to our discussions and to further working with everyone here and other partners to effectively address the global REMVE threat.
Original source can be found here.